On 3 July 2026 the European Securities and Markets Authority published a two page public statement on event contracts saying that the name a firm gives a product is irrelevant to how that product is classified, and that firms must instead conduct a careful legal analysis of the product and the way it functions. The statement runs to 858 words by our own count, and it does not say what the analysis should contain, how long it should be or who inside the firm should sign it.
That silence is worth taking seriously rather than resenting. Every question the analysis has to answer is already written down, across a directive from 2014, a delegated regulation from 2017 and a decision from 2018, and most of them are questions about product design only the operator can answer. What is missing is not the law. It is the document.
ESMA used the word analysis twice and never without the word careful
The operative passage is short. The commercial name provided by firms, ESMA writes, with event contracts given as the example, "is irrelevant for the categorisation under MiFID II of products distributed, marketed or offered to clients", and firms "must conduct a careful legal analysis of these products and their functioning, in order to check whether they may fall within the scope of application of product intervention measures". The ESMA press release of the same date frames the document as a reminder of existing rules, not a new prohibition.
Our own count over the full text shows how little it commits to beyond that. The word analysis appears twice, both times inside the phrase careful legal analysis. The word must appears three times: twice carrying the analysis, once as condition (a) of the binary option definition in footnote 3. Both appearances of the softer should carry the assessment of whether the measures apply at all. Target market and product governance appear nowhere.
One sentence widens the exercise past the product's own label: the assessment, ESMA writes, "should be conducted for all financial instruments with similar characteristics to event contracts". The trigger is the construction of the contract, not what the marketing page calls it. We looked at how four authorities use four names for the same contract in an earlier piece on the vocabulary problem.
Three of the conditions are answered from your own contract specification
The definition ESMA points towards sits in Article 1(2) of Decision (EU) 2018/795 of 22 May 2018. Irrespective of whether it is traded on a trading venue, a binary option is a derivative which must be settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one of the parties other than on default or other termination event, which only provides for payment at its close-out or expiry, and whose payment is limited to a predetermined fixed amount or zero whether or not the underlying meets one or more predetermined conditions.
Read as an analysis rather than as a definition, those three are facts about the product, not opinions about the event. How the contract settles, when it pays and what the two payoffs are all sit in the contract terms. An operator does not need outside counsel to answer them, only to write the answers down in the order the measure asks and note which version of the terms it read.
The second condition carries a trap ESMA addresses directly: a coupon or reward representing interest earned on the funds paid in "does not change the binary nature of the event contract itself". A yield running alongside a position is not an answer to when the contract pays, a mechanism we took apart in a piece on coupons that accrue while the position is still wrong.
The one question that is not about your own product
Before any of that matters, the contract has to be a financial instrument. ESMA's test is a single sentence: only event contracts whose event question relates to an underlying mentioned in Section C(4) to (10) of Annex I of MiFID II classify as financial instruments.
Section C of Annex I has eleven points and ESMA names seven. Five of the seven open by listing product families, options, futures, swaps and forwards; two name a function instead, derivative instruments for the transfer of credit risk in C(8) and financial contracts for differences in C(9). Every one turns on what the contract is about or on how it settles, and not one describes a payout. The word binary appears nowhere in Section C.
So the two steps ask opposite kinds of question. The instrument test looks at the subject of the contract and ignores the shape of the payout; the binary option definition looks at almost nothing else.
For event questions that are not obviously financial, the door is C(10): its first limb names climatic variables, freight rates, inflation rates and other official economic statistics, its second is a catch all for contracts relating to assets, rights, obligations, indices and measures not mentioned elsewhere. Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 adds eight more underlyings to that door in Article 8, among them a geological, environmental or other physical variable and an index or measure based on actuarial statistics. Whether a national authority reads a given event question into that list is decided nationally, and the answers are not uniform, as we found putting the twenty seven national answers side by side.
Cash settlement is the fact that counts at both steps
Here the two steps stop being independent. Article 7(3) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565 says that, for the purposes of Section C(10), a derivative relating to an underlying referred to in that Section or in Article 8 "shall be considered to have the characteristics of other derivative financial instruments where one of the following conditions is satisfied". The first of the three listed is that "it is settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one or more of the parties, otherwise than by reason of a default or other termination event". Condition (a) of the binary option definition reads: "it must be settled in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one of the parties other than by reason of default or other termination event".
It is very nearly the same sentence doing two different jobs. In the delegated regulation it is one of three alternatives, any single one of which pulls a C(10) contract inside the definition of a financial instrument. In the decision it is the first of three cumulative conditions that all have to hold before the contract is a binary option. The first line a cash settled venue writes about its product therefore answers a question at each step, and at both it answers in the direction that brings the contract closer to the measures. A venue that settles in cash cannot have a short analysis.
Being a trading venue counts once and is ruled out once
The same thing happens in reverse with market structure, and it is easier to miss. At the instrument step, where the contract trades is part of the test: the second limb of C(10) decides the characteristics question "having regard to whether, inter alia, they are traded on a regulated market, OTF, or an MTF", and Article 7(3)(b) makes trading on such a venue, or on a third country venue performing a similar function, sufficient on its own. At the binary option step the same fact is expressly removed, because Article 1(2) of the decision applies irrespective of whether the derivative is traded on a trading venue. Being a venue is a classification argument at the first step and no argument at all at the second.
Two answers the analysis can take from settled ground
If the analysis relies on an exclusion, the citation matters. Footnote 4 of the statement places the excluded binary options in paragraph 3 of Article 2 of Decision (EU) 2018/795, which has no such paragraph; both exclusions sit in Article 1(3) of the first renewal, Decision (EU) 2018/1466 of 21 September 2018, which we read condition by condition in a separate article on the two exemptions. And while the measures prohibit sale to retail clients, ESMA reminds firms that authorisation is required "irrespective of the category of clients to whom services are provided", so narrowing the audience answers one line of the analysis and not the other, as we set out in a piece on what a professional clients only policy removes.
The obligation ESMA attached to the analysis follows from its conclusion
The second sentence about the analysis is the one worth sitting with: firms "must conduct this careful legal analysis by adhering at all times to the overarching obligation to act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of clients, to which they are bound". That obligation is Article 24(1) of MiFID II, which requires an investment firm to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of its clients "when providing investment services or, where appropriate, ancillary services to clients". Investment services and activities are themselves defined, in Article 4(1)(2) of the same directive, as the services listed in Section A of Annex I "relating to any of the instruments listed in Section C of Annex I".
The route to the yardstick therefore runs through Section C. A firm whose analysis concludes that its contracts are not Section C instruments has concluded, in the same step, that it is not providing investment services in relation to them, so the standard it was told to measure the analysis against does not formally attach. The duty is real for whoever answers yes and dissolves for whoever answers no.
Two things stop that being a loophole. Article 4(1)(1) defines an investment firm functionally, as any legal person whose regular occupation or business is the provision of investment services to third parties, so holding no authorisation does not put an operator outside the duty. And if the conclusion turns out to be wrong, the duty was there throughout, including while the analysis was being written.
What remains is an asymmetry no regulator can fix from outside. A firm that reached a defensible conclusion and one that reached a convenient conclusion look identical from the product, and the only thing separating them is dated reasoning written before anybody asked. That is Directive 05 of our manifest in its plainest form, standards set against the jurisdiction that regulates next rather than only the one that has not yet.
Malta published four headings and addressed them to firms already inside
One national authority has gone further than ESMA on format. On 3 August 2026 the Malta Financial Services Authority passed the statement to its market with a short circular of its own. Under the heading Way Forward it tells investment firms to review their product governance, product classification and distribution arrangements, and to consider four things: the legal classification of event contracts and similar products, the appropriateness of the identified target market, compliance with the measures prohibiting sale of qualifying binary options to retail clients, and the effectiveness of controls against circumvention.
Two of those four headings are not in the ESMA text at all. By our own count over the statement, the phrase target market appears zero times and the word governance zero times, while circumvention appears once, in footnote 5. So the nearest thing to a published outline of the analysis is partly a national addition rather than a restatement.
The circular also says who it is for: "investment firms that provide investment services and activities which are subject to MiFID II". Read literally, the only published outline is addressed to firms that have already answered yes to the question the analysis exists to settle. We read the same circular for a different reason in a piece on the ledger clause in the MiCA review.
What the document has to be able to answer
This is not a template and should not become one. It is the set of questions a firm ought to answer out of a document that already exists, rather than out of a project starting the week a regulator writes to it. Each question that maps onto a provision names it, because a determination citing nothing is reviewable by nobody.
- How does the contract settle, and can any party elect cash settlement other than on default or termination? That is condition (a) of Article 1(2) of the decision and, separately, condition (a) of Article 7(3).
- When does it pay? Only at close-out or expiry, or during its life? And what are the two payoffs, each a predetermined fixed amount or zero in both branches?
- What is the event question about, and which point of Section C(4) to (10) does the underlying map to? If the answer is the C(10) catch all, which of the eight underlyings in Article 8 is relied on?
- Who is the client, through which channel, where does the contract trade, and what is the identified target market?
- What date does the determination carry, which version of the terms does it describe, and who signed it?
The question about dates and signatures is the one no regulator asked for, and the one that makes the rest usable a year later, when the terms have been amended twice and whoever wrote the analysis has moved on.
The conclusion is cheap and the reasoning is not
As of 16 November 2026 the statement of 3 July 2026 is still the live European instruction here. The European Commission's targeted consultation on the review of MiCA, the other open European file on the category, closed on 30 September 2026 with no summary of responses published. ESMA's own Risk Monitor of 10 September 2026 gives prediction markets a section of its own and leaves the question open, writing that depending on their characteristics event contracts may qualify as financial instruments under MiFID II, fall under MiCA where they are based on distributed ledger technology and are not financial instruments, or be treated as gambling products under national law.
So the analysis stays where ESMA put it, inside the firm, with the firm's name on it. The cheap half is the conclusion, and every operator already has one, usually held with some confidence. The expensive half is the reasoning, dated, with the questions above answered one at a time and the provisions named beside them. A firm that has that can turn out to be wrong and still be defensible. A firm holding only the conclusion has nothing to show, and a classification it declined to write down is one somebody else will write for it.
If that is already the standard you work to, put your name to it in public. A voluntary floor is worth something only while it exists before the mandatory one.