Order Priority Protects Nobody When Only One Maker Answers

On 6 August 2026 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission published its Conflicts and Affiliations proposal, RIN 3038-AF76, at 91 FR 50926. Comments closed on 5 October 2026 and, as of 9 November 2026, no final rule has followed. One part of it would change how a prediction market exchange may hold its own trading desk: proposed Commission Regulation 38.852(c) starts from a prohibition and opens a single door, the affiliate market maker exception, held open by four conditions. We went through the proposal as a whole when it appeared, in an earlier piece on what the exception would require. This one is about the first condition, because it is written in the vocabulary of an order book.

The exception stands on a sentence about price levels

Condition one, proposed Commission Regulation 38.852(c)(1)(i), tells the exchange to make its matching engine work against its own affiliate. In the rule text the Commission writes that a designated contract market must "fill the bid or offer of any unaffiliated member before the bid or offer of the affiliate market maker at the same price, without regard to the time priority" of the affiliate's order, and then states the result plainly: those bids and offers are to be "filled last at every price level". The Commission anchors the condition in Core Principles 2, 9 and 16, that is 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(2), (9) and (16), and Core Principle 9 asks a board of trade for a competitive, open and efficient mechanism for executing transactions that protects the price discovery process "of trading in the centralized market of the board of trade".

Read as English, the condition is a queue rule. It presumes that orders rest somewhere, that the place they rest has price levels, that two orders can sit at the same level, and that one of them can be put behind the other. In a central limit order book all four are true and visible to anyone looking at the book. This piece is about what the sentence does when none of them is. One drafting note in passing, our reading rather than anything the Commission has conceded: the rule defines affiliate market maker as a firm that satisfies all of the conditions in paragraph (c), so the obligation attaches to a status that exists only once it has been met.

The Commission writes down where the condition stops working

The proposal does not oversell subordination. In the preamble the Commission explains that "subordination has effect only where unaffiliated orders are present at a price", and that where the affiliate is the sole source of liquidity the remaining conditions in 38.852(c)(1) are the operative protections. Its numbered question (46) then asks whether, in exactly that situation, those remaining conditions protect customers at all.

One exchange operator answered that question directly. In its comment letter dated 5 October 2026, Cboe Global Markets supports every condition and asks for five additions, writing that order priority subordination "serves its purpose only when unaffiliated market makers are quoting; when the affiliate is the only market maker, it receives every fill." Cboe would therefore cap at something like six months the time an affiliate may be the only market maker in a product class, and set parameters for when a class has enough outside liquidity that the affiliate should stop trading in it. A voluntary standard could adopt that boundary without waiting for a rule.

A price that arrives on request has no level to be last in

One paragraph of the proposal, carrying footnote 200, says the Commission is aware that a designated contract market may operate a trade matching system other than a central limit order book, "for example, by offering a request for quote (RFQ) mechanism", and asks whether the subordination provision adequately addresses that case and whether it would work for other execution methods such as block trades. Footnote 200 points at one document: the help page on which Kalshi explains how its combination contracts are priced.

Both large venues publish how that mechanism works, in their own developer documentation. Kalshi's documentation states that its request for quote system covers any market including combination markets, that makers answer with a pair of prices for the full requested size, that "makers cannot see each other's quotes", and that on acceptance the exchange fills "the earliest open quote at that quote's price on that side". Polymarket describes a combinatorial request for quote system in which a user's request "starts an auction among connected market makers", makers have a 400 millisecond window to submit an executable price, and the system then "returns the best Quote" to the user.

So there is an ordering, and subordination is not impossible to build here. But look at what it can reach. Selection goes by price first, so the condition bites only on an exact tie between two answers, in a private auction, inside a window measured in fractions of a second. The customer cannot see the loser either way: Kalshi's quotes are private between the requester and each maker, and Polymarket hands the user the best quote rather than the book of answers. Where no unaffiliated maker answers at all, which Kalshi's help page says happens with longer or less popular combinations, the condition has nothing to act on. The sole liquidity case that question (46) treats as an edge is, on a quote requested for one trade, the ordinary case.

Four hundred milliseconds against an annual certification

The timings are published too. Kalshi classifies every combination market as a high volatility market, which shortens the confirmation window to 3 seconds and the execution timer to 1 second, against 30 and 15 seconds elsewhere. Polymarket gives makers 400 milliseconds to quote, the user 10 seconds to accept, and, where Last Look is enabled, the selected maker 1 second to confirm. Against that, proposed Commission Regulation 38.852(c)(2)(iii) would have an independent third party regulatory service provider certify compliance with the conditions once a year, with written documentation and analysis in support, under Commission Regulation 38.604. That is not an argument against annual certification but about what it has to be built on: nobody reviews a 400 millisecond auction by reading about it afterwards, so the evidence has to come out of the matching system at the moment of selection, shaped so an outside reviewer can test a claim about ties without re-running the venue's code.

Declining a selected fill is an option the four conditions never mention

Polymarket's documentation for market makers describes a step called Last Look: a separate final review for makers that have it enabled, in which a maker whose quote has been selected runs a risk check and accepts or declines the fill. The page says the facility is offered to makers with roughly 2,500 US dollars of combination notional volume and an established line of communication with Polymarket, that makers are expected to accept most selected quotes, and that declining more than 15 percent of them over a one hour lookback may pause a maker from quoting for a few minutes.

In an order book a resting order can be hit. Here the winner of the auction can walk away after the taker has committed, and whoever holds that right holds something worth more than a tie break. None of the four conditions addresses it: (ii)(A) requires continuous two sided quotes, (ii)(C) requires spread limits and (ii)(D) forbids directional positions outside the quoting obligation, but nothing says an affiliate may not hold a right to decline that unaffiliated members lack. We make no claim that any affiliated firm holds such a right at either venue. The point is that the rule as drafted would not notice if one did.

The numbered questions never name the mechanism the footnote points at

We counted over the full text of the proposal as published by the Government Publishing Office on 9 November 2026. In roughly 74,000 words, request for quote and RFQ appear once, in that one paragraph, and block trades appears once, in the sentence after it. The numbered request for comment on this part runs from (39) to (55). Question (43) asks whether subordination is compatible with the execution methods of swap execution facilities, which this part of the proposal expressly does not cover. Question (45) asks whether subordination is technically and operationally feasible "across the matching systems in use" and whether a switch to pro rata allocation could circumvent it. Neither of them, and none of the other fifteen, names a quote on request or a block trade on a designated contract market.

That matters practically. Comment letters are written against the numbered list, because the numbered list is what the agency reads back. A question that exists only as prose in the middle of a preamble is one most filers will not answer, and the record then shows agreement where there was silence.

The one letter that engages with the mismatch uses it somewhere else

The Futures Industry Association filed on 5 October 2026 and did engage with the point, in footnote 19 of its letter. FIA supports the Commission's decision not to extend the prohibition and the exception to swap execution facilities, and gives as its reason that the proposed conditions, order priority subordination among them, were in its words "designed principally for centralized order-book trading and do not translate readily to RFQ protocols and other SEF execution methods." The observation is the same one the Commission makes in its footnote 200 paragraph. FIA uses it to argue that the conditions should not travel to another kind of venue, not to ask what they do on the venue where they would apply. Cboe answers question (43) the other way, saying it sees no reason the prohibition and exception should not apply to swap execution facilities in the same manner.

A limit on what we can say: the comment index on regulations.gov and the Commission's own comment pages did not answer the machine this piece was researched on. The two letters above are the ones their authors publish themselves, and both were read in full. We claim nothing about the rest of the record.

The notice a customer has to acknowledge describes a book

Condition four has the same shape. Proposed Commission Regulation 38.852(c)(3) would require a notice through the order entry interface, before the customer's first order in a session, in plain language, in full rather than by a link, and not dismissible without an affirmative acknowledgment, delivered by intermediaries and anyone else operating an interface, which is the layer we looked at in a piece on who owns the first screen a trader sees. Its required content includes a statement that the affiliate market maker's orders "are filled after those of unaffiliated members at the same price". Written well, that notice is Directive 02 stated by a regulator, since the directive commits a signatory to stating conflicts of interest "in plain language on the surface where the trade happens". Recited to a trader who is about to request a quote, it spends the one interruption the rule allows on a mechanism that trader will not meet and cannot check.

Core Principle 7 already asks for the page that is missing

A venue does not have to wait for a final rule to close this gap. Commission Regulation 38.400, which implements Core Principle 7, requires a designated contract market to make available to the Commission, market participants and the public accurate information about the mechanisms for executing transactions and about "the rules and specifications describing the operation" of its electronic matching platform or trade execution facility, and Commission Regulation 38.401(d) adds that the rulebook on the venue's website must be accurate, complete and current. A description of how a quote requested for one trade is selected, including what happens on a tie, is therefore not a disclosure the industry is waiting to be asked for. It is a description of the matching platform. We did not read either venue's rulebook here, because the pages serving it did not answer, so we make no claim about what is in them; how a rulebook change is meant to reach the trader is the subject of a piece on rule changes filed by letter.

Five things a venue could publish before the rule is final

Each of these comes out of a condition the Commission has already proposed, and none needs the proposal adopted first.

  • Whether an affiliate quotes on request, and where. Cboe asked the Commission for a public list of each product an affiliate market maker quotes in. A venue can publish that list itself, by product class.
  • The selection rule, in the rulebook, word for word. Including what decides a tie at the same price, and whether the earliest or the best answer wins.
  • A subordination rule written per request rather than per price level. Namely that an unaffiliated quote wins any tie and the affiliate's answer is dropped when an unaffiliated answer matches it.
  • The affiliate's answer rate and win rate against unaffiliated quoters. Per product class, monthly. That number shows whether sole liquidity is an edge case or the normal state of the product.
  • Whether the affiliate may decline a selected fill, and how often it does. A facility the outside maker does not have is a conflict whether or not a rule names it.

Those five are also a fair reading of Directive 05, which commits a signatory to setting standards against the jurisdiction that regulates next. This proposal is that jurisdiction, in writing, with a docket number.

The product that carries the volume is the product the condition misses

This is not a narrow question about an unusual order type. Combination contracts were reported by Eilers and Krejcik Gaming, in the 2 September 2026 edition of its Front Running newsletter, to have grown from 14 percent of tracked United States sports event contract volume in February 2026 to 50 percent in August 2026. We went through that product, and how differently the two venues settle it, in an earlier piece on why every leg has to win. Those contracts are quoted on request at both venues, by the venues' own documentation. The condition carrying the exception is written for the half of the volume that rests in a book.

The fix is small, and in a final rule it is one sentence: where a designated contract market matches by any method other than a central limit order book, the affiliate loses every tie, the method and its tie break go in the rulebook, and the venue reports the affiliate's answer and win rates. The same sentence is available to a venue tomorrow morning without any rule, and whoever publishes it first describes its own mechanism instead of being described. If that is the standard your firm already wants to be held to, our commitment is public and open.

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